Agenda for a New Financial Market Architecture

Since the summer of 2007, participants in financial markets have been confronted by a crisis of their own making. In order to prevent the recurrence of a similar crisis in the future, the G-20 nations, at their finance summit in Washington on 15 November 2008, resolved to "ensure that all financial markets, products and participants are regulated or subject to oversight, as appropriate to their circumstances." However, the elimination of loopholes as a matter of principle does not in itself provide a roadmap for the reconfiguration of financial markets. DIW Berlin is promoting an agenda of nine principles for regulatory reform. Item 1 through 3 focus on the prevention of coordination failures at the micro and the macro level as well as establishing appropriate incentives front and center; item 4 through 6 sketch out opportunities and limits for the future role of government; item 7 and 8 focus on oversight. Finally, item 9 calls for a stronger emphasis on equity financing and makes an appeal for the insight that financing constraints based upon credit worthiness ultimately serve to protect the financial system.Financial crisis, Regulation, Financial architecture

Informed capital in a hostile environment: the case of relational investors in Germany

Informed capital is a crucial ingredient to a well-functioning market for start-up finance, especially in times of difficult market conditions. For bank-based systems, the question regarding which investors actually supply informed capital has not yet been answered. To fill this gap, we conduct a survey among 85 German suppliers of start-up finance. We find significant differences between the investors which are linked to banks and those financiers which are not. Although, the bank-related group, including public equity suppliers, delivers some sort of informed capital, venture capital companies and Business Angels are the key providers of informed capital in the German market for start-up finance. --Informed capital,start-up financing,venture capital,banks

Fear of Financial Investors Unjustified

In the midst of the international financial crisis, the German federal government passed the Risk Limitation Act in autumn 2007. In spring 2008 the Bundestag has finally decided on the law. The domestic private equity/buyout providers, which have not previously been subject to banking supervision, are among the main addressees of the act. Among others, "objectionable macroeconomic activities of financial investors" are to be hindered or prevented, without simultaneously "impairing efficient financial and corporate transactions". In short, the regulation of activities is intended to have a stabilizing effect in the midst of turbulent times. Private equity funds can particularly be regarded as a supplement to the traditional instruments of corporate financing. In a study recently presented by DIW Berlin, it was determined that private equity funds generally do not swarm in on German companies "like locusts". Their macroeconomic significance has so far tended to be minor. An expansion of commitment by private equity funds would be welcomed. Particularly SMEs can profit from it.Private equity, Leveraged buyouts, Corporate finance

Small-Scale Business Survival and Inheritance: Evidence from Germany

In this paper we investigate whether small-scale businesses face financial constraints that affect their survival. We develop a model of moral hazard in which financial constraints arise endogenously. The model predicts that higher private assets relax financial constraints and have a positive effect on the firm's probability of survival. We test this proposition using German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) data, which cover the period 1984-2004. The release from financial constraints is measured by inheritance. The empirical analysis confirms that the entrepreneur has a higher propensity to stay in business when she inherits capital. This effect is particularly strong for entrepreneurs that switch from self-employment into wage employment. These results are consistent with hypothesis that financial frictions have a perceptible impact on bankruptcy among small business firms.Entrepreneurship, survival, financial constraints

Entrepreneurship, Windfall Gains and Financial Constraints: The Case of Germany

In this paper we investigate the link between entrepreneurship and financial constraints. We develop a dynamic partial equilibrium model of an individual utility maximization that predicts that the person is more likely to start her business when financial constraints are eased. We test this hypothesis using German Socio-Economic Panel data covering the periods 2000 - 2002 and measure release from financial constraints by windfall gains. The estimates confirm that the individual has higher propensity to start her business when she gets windfall gains. Furthermore, there are stronger effects for persons that have sufficient, but not very high levels of income and abilities.Entrepreneurship; Windfall gains; Financial constraints

Does Gender Affect Funding Success at the Peer-to-Peer Credit Markets?: Evidence from the Largest German Lending Platform

Studies of peer-to-peer lending in the USA find that female borrowers have better chances of getting funds than males. Is differential treatment of borrowers of different sexes a common feature of peer-to-peer lendingmarkets or is it subject to specific businessmodels, ways of fixing loan contracts and even national financial systems? We aim at answering this question by providing evidence on loan procurement at the largest German peer-to-peer lending platform Smava.de. Our results show that gender does not affect individual borrower's chances of funding success on this platform, ceteris paribus. Hence, gender discrimination seems to be a platform-specific phenomenon rather than a common attribute of this innovative form of credit markets.gender, access to credit, peer-to-peer lending

German Bad Bank Plan: Government Should Take Over Toxic Assets at Zero Cost

With Germany's banking sector still suffering from the effects of the financial crisis, public discussion of plans to place toxic assets in one or more bad banks has gained steam in recent weeks. The following paper presents a bad bank plan from the German Institute for Economic Research. The key element of the plan is the valuation of troubled assets at their current market value - assets with no market would thus be valued at zero. The current shareholders will cover the losses arising from the depreciation reserve in the amount of the difference of the toxic assets' current book value and their market value. Under the plan, the government would bear responsibility for the management and future resale of toxic assets at its own cost and recapitalize the good bank by taking an equity stake in it. In extreme cases, this would mean a takeover of the bank by the government. The risk to taxpayers from this investment would be acceptable, however, once the banks are freed from toxic assets. A clear emphasis that the government stake is temporary would also be necessary. The government would cover the bad bank's losses, while profits would be distributed to the distressed bank's current shareholders. The plan is viable independent of whether the government decides to have one centralized bad bank or to establish a separate bad bank for each systemically relevant banking institute. Under the terms of the plan, bad banks and nationalization are not alternatives but rather two sides of the same coin. This plan effectively addresses three key challenges. It provides for the transparent removal of toxic assets and gives the banks a fresh start. At the same time, it offers the chance to keep the cost to taxpayers low. In addition, the risk of moral hazard is curtailed.Financial crisis, Bad bank, Recapitalization

Bad Bank(s) and Recapitalization of the Banking Sector

With banking sectors worldwide still suffering from the effects of the financial crisis, public discussion of plans to place toxic assets in one or more bad banks has gained steam in recent weeks. The following paper presents a plan how governments can efficiently relieve ailing banks from toxic assets by transferring these assets into a publicly sponsored work-out unit, a so-called bad bank. The key element of the plan is the valuation of troubled assets at their current market value - assets with no market would thus be valued at zero. The current shareholders will cover the losses arising from the depreciation reserve in the amount of the difference of the toxic assets' current book value and their market value. Under the plan, the government would bear responsibility for the management and future resale of toxic assets at its own cost and recapitalize the good bank by taking an equity stake in it. In extreme cases, this would mean a takeover of the bank by the government. The risk to taxpayers from this investment would be acceptable, however, once the banks are freed from toxic assets. A clear emphasis that the government stake is temporary would also be necessary. The government would cover the bad bank's losses, while profits would be distributed to the distressed bank's current shareholders. The plan is viable independent of whether the government decides to have one centralized bad bank or to establish a separate bad bank for each systemically relevant banking institute. Under the terms of the plan, bad banks and nationalization are not alternatives but rather two sides of the same coin. This plan effectively addresses three key challenges. It provides for the transparent removal of toxic assets and gives the banks a fresh start. At the same time, it offers the chance to keep the cost to taxpayers low. In addition, the risk of moral hazard is curtailed. The comparison of the proposed design with the bad bank plan of the German government reveals some shortcomings of the latter plan that may threaten the achievement of these key issues.Financial crisis, financial regulation, toxic assets, Bad Bank

Bad Bank(s) and Recapitalization of the Banking Sector

With banking sectors worldwide still suffering from the effects of the financial crisis, public discussion of plans to place toxic assets in one or more bad banks has gained steam in recent weeks. The following paper presents a plan how governments can efficiently relieve ailing banks from toxic assets by transferring these assets into a publicly sponsored work-out unit, a so-called bad bank. The key element of the plan is the valuation of troubled assets at their current market value – assets with no market would thus be valued at zero. The current shareholders will cover the losses arising from the depreciation reserve in the amount of the difference of the toxic assets’ current book value and their market value. Under the plan, the government would bear responsibility for the management and future resale of toxic assets at its own cost and recapitalize the good bank by taking an equity stake in it. In extreme cases, this would mean a takeover of the bank by the government. The risk to taxpayers from this investment would be acceptable, however, once the banks are freed from toxic assets. A clear emphasis that the government stake is temporary would also be necessary. The government would cover the bad bank’s losses, while profits would be distributed to the distressed bank’s current shareholders. The plan is viable independent of whether the government decides to have one centralized bad bank or to establish a separate bad bank for each systemically relevant banking institute. Under the terms of the plan, bad banks and nationalization are not alternatives but rather two sides of the same coin. This plan effectively addresses three key challenges. It provides for the transparent removal of toxic assets and gives the banks a fresh start. At the same time, it offers the chance to keep the cost to taxpayers low. In addition, the risk of moral hazard is curtailed. The comparison of the proposed design with the bad bank plan of the German government reveals some shortcomings of the latter plan that may threaten the achievement of these key issues.financial crisis, financial regulation, toxic assets, bad bank

The determinants of debt and (private-) equity financing in young innovative SMEs: evidence from Germany

Financial theory creates a puzzle. Some authors argue that high-risk entrepreneurs choose debt contracts instead of equity contracts since risky but high returns are of relatively more value for a loan-financed firm. On the contrary, authors who focus explicitly on start-up finance predict that entrepreneurs are the more likely to seek equity-like venture capital contracts, the more risky their projects are. Our paper makes a first step to resolve this puzzle empirically. We present microeconometric evidence on the determinants of debt and equity financing in young and innovative SMEs. We pay special attention to the role of risk for the choice of the financing method. Since risk is not directly observable we use different indicators for financial and project risk. It turns out that our data generally confirms the hypothesis that the probability that a young high-tech firm receives equity financing is an increasing function of the financial risk. With regard to the intrinsic project risk, our results are less conclusive, as some of our indicators of a risky project are found to have a negative effect on the likelihood to be financed by private equity